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Abstract
What is the effect of source claims (such as “I saw it” or “Somebody told me”) on the believability of statements, and what
mechanisms are responsible for this effect? In this study, we tested the idea that source claims impact statement believability by
modulating the extent to which a speaker is perceived to be committed to (and thereby accountable for) the truth of her assertion.
Across three experiments, we presented participants with statements associated with different source claims, asked them to judge
how much they believed the statements, and how much the speaker was responsible if the statement turned out to be false. We
found that (1) statement believability predicted speaker accountability independently of a statement’s perceived prior likelihood
or associated source claim; (2) being associated with a claim to first-hand (“I saw that . . .”) or second-hand (“Somebody told me
that . . .”) evidence strengthened this association; (3) bare assertions about specific circumstances were commonly interpreted as
claims to first-hand evidence; and (4) (everything else being equal) claims to first-hand evidence increased while claims to
second-hand evidence decreased both statement believability and speaker accountability. These results support the idea that the
believability of a statement is closely related to how committed to its truth the speaker is perceived to be and that source claims
modulate the extent of this perceived commitment.
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Unlike most other animals, human beings form a large part of
their beliefs without relying on direct personal experience.
Instead, we acquire many of our beliefs socially, through the
testimony of others. The capacity for social information trans-
mission allows us to learn about places we have never visited
and about times we have never lived through. It also allows us
to form beliefs that are too abstract (“The distance from the
earth to the moon is 384,499 km”) or opaque (“God is the
unity of a Trinity”) to ever be formed on the basis of personal
experience alone (Gergely & Csibra, 2011). However, even
though human communicative capacities might look like a
super power from the perspective of other species lacking
such abilities, they have various cognitive ‘conditions of
possibility’ (Sperber et al., 2010). In particular, in order for
such a complex system of cooperative communicative ex-
change of information to be evolutionarily stable, both
speakers and listeners need to benefit from this exchange.
On the one hand, speakers require mechanisms to influence
a listener’s mind in the absence of trust. On the other hand,
listeners need to be able to determine when to rely on mes-
sages from speakers who might not always have an interest in
transmitting true information.
Speaker commitment can stabilize human
communication
One device which has the potential to solve this dilemma is
commitment (e.g., Brandom, 1983; Geurts, 2019). If speakers
can signal different degrees to which they are willing to take
responsibility for the truth of their messages, and listeners can
track these signals, this might support the stabilization of com-
munication. By signaling the extent to which they are ready to
bear either direct or reputational consequences in case they are
found to be wrong, speakers might allow listeners to gauge
how much to rely on the truth of the claim in question
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(Bonalumi et al., 2019). In essence, the strength of a speaker’s
commitment might be viewed as a signal for how much she is
willing to ‘bet’ on the truth of her assertion. On the one hand,
this allows listeners to accept claims they might otherwise
reject on the guarantee of the speaker. On the other hand, it
allows speakers to ‘hedge their bets’ so as to avoid responsi-
bility for a potentially false claim.
From this perspective, the believability of a statement
should to some extent depend on how accountable a speaker
has made herself for its truth. In other words, how much peo-
ple believe a given statement should be predicted by how
accountable they hold a speaker when they find out that the
statement was wrong. Such an effect has been found in the
investigation of various pragmatic phenomena. For example,
expressions of confidence or certainty (Lorson et al., 2021;
Vullioud et al., 2016), different pragmatic devices for
encoding speaker meaning (Mazzarella et al., 2018), and mod-
al expressions (Degen et al., 2019) have all been shown to
modulate perceived speaker commitment.
The role of source claims in communication
However, one device that has so far not been explicitly inves-
tigated from this perspective is source claims (i.e., claims about
the origin of the information in question). This is surprising
given that source claims seem to have a large impact on how
believable a statement is perceived to be (Mercier, 2020).When
deciding what to believe, listeners do not only pay attention to
the content of the message and the identity of the speaker
(Collins et al., 2018; Sperber et al., 2010), but also to what
evidence a speaker purports to have (Koenig, 2012). Even pre-
schoolers have been shown to preferably believe assertions
supported by claims to first-hand evidence over claims support-
ed by circular arguments (Castelain et al., 2016; Mercier et al.,
2014). The effect of source information on believability should
be particularly familiar to members of institutions dealing in
‘knowledge production’, such as academia and journalism.
Here, accurate source reporting is conceived of as a central,
ethical requirement for good practice. A claim that at first sight
might seem uncontroversial can be undermined when attributed
to an untrustworthy source. Conversely, a claim that might
seem unlikely can become believable in association with an
authoritative source (e.g., Sperber et al., 2010). In particular,
‘having been there’ seems to convey such authority beyond
mere expertise. In fact, qualitative research methods (such as
ethnography) might be said to be based to a large extent on the
authority that first-hand experience conveys.
While the role of sources in institutionalized forms of
knowledge production is particularly prominent, source infor-
mation plays an important role in everyday communication,
too. For example, source claims have been identified to play
an important role in the transmission of rumors and gossip
(Altay & Mercier, 2020; Caplow, 1947; DiFonzo & Bordia,
2002). Moreover, source claims can be used to claim credit,
hedge one’s bets, or increase believability (Altay, Claidière, &
Mercier, 2020; Altay, Majima, & Mercier, 2020; Shaw &
Olson, 2015).
The pronounced effects of source information in commu-
nication have arguably led to its grammaticalization in at least
one quarter of all recorded languages as ‘evidentials’ (e.g.,
Aikhenvald, 2004, 2014, 2018). However, even languages
that do not encode source claims through explicit grammatical
markers have a multitude of ways to express evidentiality. For
example, modal expressions in English and German (such as
must, presumably, maybe, definitely) have an evidential inter-
pretation (Degen et al., 2019). In fact, the role of source infor-
mation in communication is so important that Mahr and
Csibra (2018; 2020) have proposed that it contributed to shap-
ing the evolution of episodic memory to serve as a form of
source memory in humans. Mahr and Csibra explicitly argued
that source memory plays such an important role in commu-
nication because it allows speakers to effectively modulate
their conversational commitments and thereby greatly expand
their communicative competencies.
Intuitions about the differential reliability
of sources
More generally, humans reason about different sources of in-
formation and have strong intuitions about their differential
reliability (Papafragou et al., 2007; Ünal& Papafragou, 2018).
In particular, we seem to regard direct perceptual evidence as
more reliable than inferential and reportative evidence.Ceteris
paribus, claims to more direct sources of evidence (such as
perception) intuitively increase the believability of a state-
ment, while claims to more indirect sources of evidence (such
as hearsay) decrease its believability. Of course, whenever a
specific second-hand source is specified, this relationship
might not hold (your doctor might knowmore about the cause
of your symptoms than you do in spite of your direct experi-
ence of them). And clearly, the identity of the speaker herself
will make a large difference to the effect of her evidential
claim (if you’re known to be a pathological liar, I won’t be-
lieve you, even if you claim to have first-hand knowledge).
Nonetheless, second-hand information is often regarded as
less reliable than first-hand information qua being second-
hand. This intuition is also reflected in legal history: many
legal systems (such as in medieval Europe, ancient Athens,
or ancient Hindu law) have historically forbidden hearsay as a
source of evidence (Mercier & Boyer, 2021). Similarly, in
epistemology a fundamental disagreement divides ‘reduction-
ists’ such as Hume (see also, e.g., Adler, 2002; Van Cleve,
2006) and ‘antireductionists’ such as Reid (see also, e.g.,
Coady, 1992; Hardwig, 1985) over the question whether
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testimony by itself provides sufficient justification for belief
or whether we need additional positive reasons to be justified
in accepting information transmitted via testimony.
Such intuitions about the differential reliability of differ-
ent sources have been shown to emerge in childhood. For
example, 3-year-olds already seem to take second-hand ev-
idence to be less reliable than direct evidence (Robinson &
Whitcombe, 2003). Further, Fitneva (2008) showed that
Bulgarian 6-year-old to 9-year-old children judged that a
third party would be more likely to believe statements
marked by perceptual and first-hand evidentials compared
with statements marked by inferential and reportative evi-
dentials (for evidence from Turkish, see Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2016). Similarly, Lane et al. (2018) recently
found that 6-year-olds to 8-year-olds preferred claims to
first-hand evidence in belief formation about improbable
events. However, this effect only emerged when claims to
first-hand evidence were contrasted with claims to second-
hand evidence. Claims to first-hand evidence alone did not
change children’s beliefs.
In contrast, in adults the effect of explicit evidential
claims on statement believability has not received much
attention through experimental research. Wilson,
Wilczynski, Wells, and Weiser (2000) found that eyewit-
ness accounts increased the credibility of statements com-
pared with second-hand accounts only in scenarios that
were of high social importance. But these authors did not
measure how different evidential claims impacted per-
ceived speaker commitment. Collins and Hahn (2019) re-
cently found that indirect evidential claims such as “I sus-
pect that . . .” did not allow speakers to ‘hedge their bets’;
that is, speakers asserting a falsehood paired with an indi-
rect source claim still received a hit to their reputation in the
eyes of their listeners. However, this study did not investi-
gate direct or reportative evidential claims and did not in-
clude assessments of the impact of evidential claims on
statement believability.
Source claims and their relationship
to speaker commitment
While the intuition that statements based on first-hand evidence
are generally more believable than statements based on second-
hand evidence is widespread (Faller, 2001), it is less clear why
it should hold. In particular, the current study was designed to
distinguish between two possible mechanisms.
First, it is possible that the effect of evidential claims on
statement believability is due to purely ‘epistemic’ factors.
That is, listeners might assume that different kinds of sources
are ordered according to a ‘scale of reliability’ (Faller, 2001,
2002). Such assumptions might be rooted in a tacit theory
about how information behaves when it ‘travels’. Listeners
might believe that, since perception is most directly causally
connected to the world, beliefs formed on its basis should be
most likely to be true. In contrast, if a piece of information is
not acquired by perception directly but instead through infer-
ence from perception, chances for informational degradation
increase. As a consequence, listeners might assume that,
ceteris paribus, any inferential ‘step’ a given piece of infor-
mation is removed from direct perception has the potential to
degrade the quality of said information. In the case of claims
based on second-hand evidence, information has to be per-
ceived, communicated, received, and communicated again in
order to arrive at the listener. If listeners indeed have a tacit
theory about informational degradation through inference, and
if listeners implicitly track how many inferential steps a piece
of information traversed to arrive at them, they should argu-
ably rely less on assertions based on second-hand evidence
compared with first-hand evidence (everything else being
equal). In essence, on this view, evidential claims influence
statement believability in a similar way as arguments do: by
providing a reason (in the form of a source claim), which
might allow the listener to weigh the strength of the evidence
herself.
Even though it is possible that people do indeed reason
about source information in this way (i.e., as arguments) this
cannot entirely explain why claims to first-hand evidence
should ceteris paribus be held to be more believable than
claims to second-hand evidence. First, note that source claims
do not function like other reasons or arguments in the sense
that they do not merely leave it up to an audience to come to
the same conclusion as the speaker on the basis of impartial
evidence. At least in the case of claims to first-hand evidence,
a source claim must to some extent come down to the audi-
ence’s trust in the speaker. As such, if claiming first-hand
evidence exclusively impacted an audience’s beliefs through
appealing to people’s intuitions about the differential reliabil-
ity of sources, it would leave such an audience open to ma-
nipulation. What would keep a manipulative speaker from
regularly purporting to have first-hand evidence in order to
increase her believability? In other words, if claims to first-
hand evidence indeed increase a statement’s believability,
they arguably can only do so at a potential cost to the speaker.
Thus, a second way of explaining the differential effect of
claims to direct versus indirect forms of evidence might be
through social factors. On standard accounts of the speech act
of asserting (Brandom, 1983; Geurts, 2019), making an asser-
tion commits the speaker to the truth of a proposition.
Listeners monitor what a speaker commits herself to and take
these commitments as signals for the reliability of whatever
the speaker is asserting. Source claims might therefore have
differential effects on how reliable their assertion is perceived
to be not solely through listeners’ assumptions about how
perception and report generally affect the reliability of testi-
mony. Instead, source claims might impact statement
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believability also by modulating what additional commit-
ments a speaker is viewed to undertake.1 That is, while mak-
ing an assertion always produces a commitment to a given
proposition, embedding a proposition in an evidential clause
might modulate this commitment or produce additional com-
mitments. For example, when a speaker makes a claim to
direct evidence (e.g., “I saw that p”), listeners might take her
to be committed to both p (‘seeing’ being a factive expression)
as well as to knowing that p. In contrast, when a speaker
makes a claim based on reportative evidence (e.g.,
“Somebody told me that p”), she might not be taken to be
committed to p but only to the fact that she was told that p.
As a consequence, while claims to direct evidence will com-
monly commit the speaker to the truth of the embedded prop-
osition, claims to indirect evidence might not (or at least not
directly).
Evidential claims might therefore be another means
through which speakers can signal what they are committed
to. In fact, source claims might be particularly effective in this
regard. After all, when a speaker claims to have first-hand
information, she implicitly accepts direct responsibility for
the truth of her assertion. If a speaker claiming to have first-
hand evidence is found to be wrong, she cannot defer respon-
sibility to anything but the failing of her perceptual system or
memory. In contrast, if a speaker claims to have second-hand
evidence for a proposition, she will always be able to
(partially) defer responsibility for its truth to this second-
hand source. As such, she should be perceived to be different-
ly committed than in the case of having claimed first-hand
evidence.2 Thus, on this view, source claims do not exclusive-
ly impact statement believability through their function as
arguments but can also function as commitment signals
(akin to modal claims such as expressions of confidence,
e.g., Vullioud et al., 2016).
Indeed, speakers seem to be intently sensitive to these dif-
ferential social effects of their evidential claims. Speakers
have been shown to flexibly adjust their source claims in ser-
vice of their communicative goals. For example, Altay,
Cladiére, and Mercier (2020) recently showed that speakers
in a transmission chain experiment were biased towards
reporting their source for rumors as being a ‘friend of a friend’,
thereby optimizing believability while minimizing
accountability. Giardini and Conte (2012) similarly reported
ethnographic evidence suggesting that speakers adaptively
avoid being seen as the source of gossip in order to avoid
accountability. In contrast, Castelain et al. (2019) have shown
that members of Ecuadorian small-scale societies were likely
to present information as if it had been acquired by them
personally rather than revealing the second-hand source of
their belief when it was beneficial to do so.
Similar arguments have been discussed in the literature on
evidentials in the context of the question to what extent evi-
dential markers only convey information about source or
whether they also convey other information, such as speaker
commitment (e.g., Aikhenvald, 2004, 2018; Chafe, 1986). In
particular, it has been debated whether evidential and modal
expressions (i.e., expressions of certainty) should be categor-
ically distinguished. For example, Faller (2002) proposed that
one way to draw the distinction is by pointing to the fact that,
while evidentials semantically encode information source, ep-
istemic modals merely imply it. Conversely, epistemic modals
might be said to encode different speaker commitments while
evidentials merely imply them. Regardless of one’s stance on
this question, however, it has been observed that, just as modal
expressions, evidential claims can have effects on speaker
commitment (e.g., Wierner, 2018; see Degen et al., 2019, for
experimental evidence in this regard). Framed in these terms
then, the question we are asking here is whether differential
effects on reliability judgments of different evidential claims
can be accounted for purely through semantically encoded
information (i.e., assumptions about the properties of the re-
spective source) or whether inferences to speaker commitment
play a role as well.
The present study
Crucially, having undertaken a commitment should be partic-
ularly apparent when the commitment is viewed to have been
broken. Therefore, one way to measure what a speaker is
viewed to be conversationally committed to is to test how
listeners react when certain aspects of her assertion turn out
to be false. By asking participants howmuch they hold a given
speaker accountable for ‘being wrong’ we can assess to what
extent they took that speaker to be committed to the proposi-
tion in question. As such, the view taking evidential claims to
function exclusively as arguments does not predict a straight-
forward connection between their effect on statement believ-
ability and speaker accountability. If source claims affect the
believability of a statement purely through appealing to lis-
teners’ intuitions about the effects of different sources on a
statement’s reliability, how accountable the speaker is viewed
to be for the truth of her assertion should not be modulated by
source claims.
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making some clarifying suggestions
on this point.
2 Of course, it is worth mentioning that evidential claims likely do have epi-
stemic functions that are independent of their effect on speaker commitment.
For example, source tags might provide background information about what
else the speakermight know (e.g., Faller, 2002; Nagel, 2015). Moreover, while
evidential claims are akin to expressions of certainty, they differ in their flex-
ibility: While one can freely modulate one’s expressed degree of certainty,
changing what source one claims to have might be viewed as lying. Thus,
we are not claiming here that evidential claims are identical to modal expres-
sions. Rather, we propose that modal and evidential expressions sometimes
achieve epistemic effects in similar ways—namely, through the modulation of
perceived speaker commitment.
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In contrast, viewing source claims as commitment devices
predicts that such claims should modulate both the extent to
which a statement is believed and how accountable a speaker
is viewed for its truth. The main goal of the present study was
therefore to differentiate between these two accounts by test-
ing whether claims to first-hand and second-hand evidence
differentially impact the relationship between statement be-
lievability and speaker accountability. After all, if it is indeed
the case that claims to first-hand but not second-hand evidence
commit the speaker to having knowledge about the proposi-
tion in question, this difference should affect how accountable
listeners hold a speaker in each case if the proposition turns
out to be false.
More specifically, we predicted that, if source claims serve
as commitment devices, being associated with a source claim
should increase how strongly a statement’s believability pre-
dicts the speaker’s accountability. This should be true even
though claims to first-hand and second-hand evidence should
impact believability and accountability in opposite directions.
If a speaker purports to have direct evidence for the truth of a
given proposition, this should increase both how believable
her statement is viewed to be and how accountable the speaker
is taken to be in case the embedded proposition is found to be
false. In contrast, claims to reportative evidence should have
the opposite effect.
Thus, in the current study, we set out to (1) test whether
claims to first-hand and second-hand evidence differ in their
effects on statement believability, and (2) whether analogous
effects can be found on how accountable a speaker is viewed
for the truth of their assertion.
We investigated these questions in three experiments (see
Fig. 1). In Experiment 1, we sought to determine (1) whether
claims to first-hand evidence and claims to second-hand evi-
dence impact statement believability and speaker accountabil-
ity in opposite directions, (2) whether a relationship between
statement believability and speaker accountability exists, (3)
whether this relationship is impacted by the modulation of
speaker commitment that making a source claim should entail,
and (4) how these effects interact with a statement’s prior
likelihood. To do so, we carried out an online, vignette-
based experiment in which participants were presented with
two contradictory statements by different speakers about the
same specific past event in four different vignette contexts.
Participants completed three tasks on these materials.
First, participants were presented with a ‘Likelihood judg-
ment task’: each statement was presented without an associat-
ed source claim or speaker, and participants were asked to
evaluate how likely they perceived it to be.
Next, participants were asked to complete a ‘Believability
judgment task’: they were presented with each vignette context
and the associated statement again, however, this time each
statement was presented as being asserted by a different speak-
er, each making either a source claim about how they came to
know about what they were stating or merely asserting the
statement. Speakers claimed to have information about the
event based either on (1) having seen it (“I saw that . . .”), (2)
having been told (“Somebody told me that . . .”) or (3) without
an explicit source claim. Participants were then asked to rate
how much they believed each of the speakers.
Finally, participants were presented with each vignette con-
text and the associated statements (with the respective eviden-
tial claims) a third time and asked to complete an
‘Accountability judgment task’: for each vignette context, they
received new information which revealed that, in fact, both
statements had been false. For example, in one of the vignette
contexts both speakers claimed that the Boston Celtics had lost
their last game to the Los Angeles Lakers (each claiming a
different point differential). In the second phase of the experi-
ment, it was revealed that, in fact, the Celtics had beaten the
Lakers. Participants were then asked to make ‘accountability
judgments’, that is, to report how much they blamed each
speaker for having made a false statement (“How much do
you blame [speaker] for misleading you?”).
One issue of relevance in this context is the question how
evidential claims affect different kinds of assertions (Stephens
& Koenig, 2015). On the one hand, claims about a well-
specified spatiotemporal context (‘episodic claims’) might be
well suited to be justified and supported through claims to
direct experience. The fact that I saw that Peter kissed Mary,
might allow me to speak authoritatively about the fact that,
indeed, Peter kissed Mary. On the other hand, it is less clear
what the effect of claims to direct experience should be on
claims about generics (‘semantic claims’). After all, the fact
that I saw Peter kissing Mary might, for example, not allow
me to speak with the same authority about whether they are a
couple or not. Making the claim that “I saw that Peter and
Mary are a couple” might instead be interpreted as having
evidence through inference. To avoid these complications,
we restricted our experimental materials exclusively to epi-
sodic claims: assertions about particular, past events.
Our main predictions here were as follows. First, regarding
source claim effects on believability, we predicted that claims
to first-hand evidence (‘seen’ claims) would increase, while
claims to second-hand evidence (‘told’ claims) would de-
crease statement believability compared with bare assertions.
Second, regarding source claim effects on the relationship
between believability and accountability, we predicted that,
when a given statement was associated with a ‘seen’ or ‘told’
claim, believability and accountability judgments should be
more highly correlated than when a statement was barely
asserted. A more detailed description of these predictions
can be found below.
Next, in Experiments 2 and 3 we investigated the relation-
ship between bare assertions and claims to first-hand evi-
dence. In particular, we investigated whether participants
pragmatically interpret bare assertions as ‘seen’ claims (for a
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similar effect see, e.g., Degen et al., 2019) with the use of a
memory confusion paradigm (see Fig. 1). Note that, on the
account outlined above, both bare assertions and claims to di-
rect evidence commit the speaker to the truth of the embedded
proposition. Moreover, a bare assertion for an episodic claim
might be taken to imply that the speaker has good evidence for
the truth of that proposition. Hence, bare assertions and claims
to first-hand evidence might be difficult to distinguish based on
believability and accountability ratings alone. For this reason,
we asked whether participants would sometimes encode bare
assertions as claims to first-hand evidence and would therefore
be more likely to recall bare assertions as ‘seen’ claims than
vice versa. This allowed us to then test the same predictions as
in Experiment 1: Experiment 2 asked whether, controlling for
similarities in interpretation, ‘seen’ claims were associated with
higher believability ratings than bare assertions, and
Experiment 3 allowed us to ask whether an analogous effect
could be found in accountability judgments.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 made the following predictions (see Fig. 2).
Prediction 1.1: Claims to first-hand evidence (‘having
seen’) should increase while claims to second-hand evi-
dence (‘having been told’) should decrease the believabil-
ity of a statement relative to bare assertions.
Prediction 1.2: Accountability judgments should be pre-
dicted by how believable participants took a statement to
be, but not by how likely they judged it to be true.
Prediction 1.3: This association between believability
and accountability should be impacted by our source
claim factor: A statement being associated with a claim
to first-hand or second-hand evidence should increase the
extent to which believability and accountability ratings
are associated compared with statements being merely
asserted.
Prediction 1.4: The association between believability
and likelihood ratings should depend on source
claims: A statement being associated with a claim to
first-hand or second-hand evidence should decrease
the extent to which believability and likelihood rat-
ings are associated compared with statements being
merely asserted.
Prediction 1.5: Merely asserting a statement should in-
crease its believability compared with how likely it was
judged to be prior to being associated with such an
assertion.
To motivate Prediction 1.2, consider that making an as-
sertion is likely to commit a speaker to the truth of a prop-
osition and therefore should make them somewhat account-
able in case it is found to be false. Thus, believability and
accountability should be correlated across all source claim
conditions. In contrast, there should be no such relationship
between accountability and how likely participants
Fig. 1 Task structure for Experiments 1 through 3
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perceive a given statement to be. This should be the case in
spite of the fact that perceived likelihood should have a
strong influence on how believable a given statement is
taken to be. That is, both accountability and likelihood
should be related to believability without being related to
each other.
However, the association between accountability and
believability should be increased whenever a speaker ac-
tively modulates their commitment. Prediction 1.3 cap-
tures this idea: If source claims indeed modulate believ-
ability in virtue of their effect on speaker commitment, we
should find increased correlation between believability
and accountability for statements associated with an
explicit source claim compared with statements not asso-
ciated with such a claim. Crucially, again, this relation-
ship should not be explained by how likely a statement is
taken to be. While likelihood judgments should capture
how much participants believe a certain statement based
on their prior knowledge, believability judgments should
capture how much participants believe that statement
when asserted by a speaker. As such, the variability of
accountability ratings should explain the variability of be-
lievability ratings (Prediction 1.2) but not necessarily that
of likelihood ratings (Prediction 1.4).
As a corollary of this prediction, we might expect that
merely asserting a statement might increase a statement’s
Fig. 2 Graphical depiction of the predictions for Experiment 1. Predictions for the effect of source claims (i.e., Prediction 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4) are depicted
in relation to the “bare assertion” baseline condition
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believability compared with how likely it was judged without
having been asserted by anyone: making an assertion should
increase believability not just because asserting is committal
but also because asserting a claim provides evidence to a lis-
tener that at least one other person believes the claim in ques-
tion (Prediction 1.5.)
Note that, due to the correlational nature of the current
design, and in spite of these predictions, we will not be
able to make causal claims about the relationship between
statement believability and speaker accountability. The
causal arrow could thus go in both directions: On the
one hand, participants might compute speaker commit-
ment when they are exposed to a given statement and
calibrate their believability judgments on this basis.3 On
the other hand, believability might drive perceived speak-
er accountability. In this case, participants might perceive
speakers to be more accountable for statements that they
‘were made to believe’. While the predictions of the cur-
rent study were derived from the former account, we will
not be able to rule out the latter. In either case, however,
source claims would have—either directly or indirectly




We recruited 509 native-English speaking participants on-
line using Amazon Mechanical Turk. If participants pro-
vided the same response to all questions for at least one of
our measures (believability or accountability judgments),
we took this as an indication that they did not complete the
task correctly and excluded them from our analysis.
Eighty-two participants were excluded this way, leaving
427 participants in the final sample (mean age = 33.51
years, SD = 6.23, 203 females). All experiments reported
here were approved by Central European University’s
United Ethical Review Committee for Research in
Psychology (EPKEB).
Design
The structure of the task and the mater ia ls for
Experiment 1 are summarized in Fig. 1. Vignette con-
texts and the associated statements were constructed to
ensure that both statements referred to the same spatio-
temporal context (e.g., the same game of basketball)
while being mutually exclusive (i.e., both statements
could not be true at the same time).
After participants had completed a consent form, they
were instructed that they would read a number of vi-
gnettes and make likelihood judgments about each state-
ment presented by itself (“How likely do you think it is that
[Statement 1]”; “How likely do you think it is that
[Statement 2]”; 1 = not at all likely; 6 = very likely).
Participants were then presented with the same vignettes
and statements again, however, the two statements were
now associated with different speakers and source claims,
and believability judgments were requested about each.
After having completed all believability judgments (“How
much do you believe [Speaker 1]?”; “How much do you
believe [Speaker 2]?” 1 = not at all; 6 = completely), par-
ticipants were then presented with each vignette again in
the same order (including each statement) and received new
information about the context, which revealed that the
statements of both speakers had in fact been wrong. For
each vignette, participants were then asked to judge how
much they hold each speaker accountable for being wrong
(“How much do you blame [Speaker 1] for misleading
you?”; “How much do you blame [Speaker 2] for mislead-
ing you?” 1 = not at all; 6 = completely). We did not tell
participants about the subsequent judgments so as to avoid
any interference effects between these different judgments.
Thus, Experiment 1 had two nested factors: (1) what
source claim a given individual statement was associated
with (‘seen’, ‘told’, ‘bare assertion’) and (2) which two
source claims were contrasted with one another in a giv-
en trial (‘seen vs. told’; ‘seen vs. bare assertion’; ‘told
vs. bare assertion’; ‘bare assertion vs. bare assertion’;
see Fig. 1). Given that in any given trial two contradic-
tory statements were contrasted with one another, our
analysis focused on the ‘source contrast’ factor. Our de-
pendent measures were Likelihood (as assessed by the
likelihood question), Believability (as assessed by the
believability question) and Accountability (as assessed
by the accountability question). All judgments were re-
corded on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 6 =
completely).
Even though each participant was exposed to each
vignette and each statement, we counterbalanced which
source claim was associated with which statement, the
order in which vignette contexts were presented, as well
as which source contrast was associated with which
3 Note that it would be possible for accountability assessments to drive believ-
ability judgments in spite of the fact that, in the current study, we measure
accountability after believability. This delayed measurement is due to the
circumstance that our method for measuring accountability requires partici-
pants to receive new information that reveals the speaker’s statement to be
false. Nonetheless, participants might compute a speaker’s commitment when
they decide how much to believe their assertion (that is, when we measure
believability) which in turn should drive their accountability judgments.
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vignette across participants. Thus, across participants
each vignette was associated with each source contrast
and each individual statement was associated with each
source claim.
Materials
Each vignette consisted of a short description of an everyday
occurrence accompanied with a picture depicting the de-
scribed situation (the full stimulus set of vignettes can be
f ound he r e : h t t p s : / / o s f . i o / y zp sh / ?v i ew_on l y=
886a9467643946f784ced6f23a494b07). The following is an
example of one of the vignettes with the accompanying
statements in each task.
Vignette context:
You are a big fan of the Boston Celtics basketball team.
Unfortunately, you missed their last game against the
Los Angeles Lakers because you were on the road to
visit your family. When you arrive, you ask your
brothers David and Carl how the game went.
[Picture depicting the context]
Likelihood judgment task:
Please evaluate how likely it would be that:
The Lakers beat the Celtics 105 to 92. [1 = not at all
likely; 6 = very likely]
The Lakers beat the Celtics by two points. [1 = not at all
likely; 6 = very likely]
Believability judgment task:
David answers: “[I saw that / somebody told me that / no
source claim] the Lakers beat the Celtics 105 to 92.”
Carl answers: “[I saw that / somebody told me that / no
source claim] the Lakers won by 2 points.”
[How much do you believe David? 1 = not at all; 6 =
completely]
[How much do you believe Carl? 1 = not at all; 6 =
completely]
Accountability judgment task:
For this vignette, participants subsequently received the
following new information onwhich to base their accountabil-
ity judgments:
When you check the results of the game on your phone
before going to bed, you find out that, contrary to what
your brothers told you, the Boston Celtics actually beat
the Lakers 108 to 103.
[How much do you blame David for misleading you?]
[How much do you blame Carl for misleading you?]
Results
Because our experimental design exposed the participants
to contrasts between two statements associated with differ-
ent source claims, our analysis primarily focused on the
source contrast factor. Thus, we computed difference
scores for each source contrast while treating ‘bare asser-
tions’ as a baseline. That is, we computed the difference
between believability/accountability ratings in a given trial
in the following way:
(1) ‘Seen’ statement—‘Told’ statement
(2) ‘Seen’ statement—Bare Assertion
(3) ‘Told’ Statement—Bare Assertion
(4) Bare Assertion—Bare Assertion
In addition to believability and accountability judg-
ments, we also calculated difference scores for likelihood
ratings following the same logic (i.e., by subtracting rat-
ing values according to which source claim condition a
given statement would be associated with in the subse-
quent believability and accountability judgment tasks).
Because we counterbalanced which statement was associ-
ated with which source claim in two counterbalancing
orders across participants, the above logic of computing
difference scores meant that, for half of our participants
ratings for the first statement in a given trial were
subtracted from the ratings for second statement, while
for the other half of participants the opposite was the case.
Thus, difference scores for (4) were calculated by
subtracting ratings for the first statement from those for
the second statement in counterbalancing Order 1 and
vice versa in counterbalancing Order 2. Each participant
contributed one such difference score per source contrast
condition (see Fig. 3a).4 All analyses for this and the
subsequent experiments were carried out in R (R Core
Team, 2020) and RStudio (RStudio Team, 2020), plots
were generated with ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016), and
mixed-effects regression models were computed with
lme4 (Bates et al., 2015).
4 In contrast to believability and likelihood judgments, accountability judg-
ments showed both a higher number of extreme (i.e., maximal) responses as
well as a higher number of zeroes in difference scores. Because this suggested
that participants had used the rating scales differently in making likelihood,
believability, and accountability judgments, respectively, we computed mar-
ginal entropies (with the use of the entropy R package, Hausser & Strimmer,
2009) for likelihood (HLikelihod = 2.21), believability (HBelievability = 2.24), and
accountability difference scores (HAccountability = 2.01) to test whether they
contained a comparable amount of variability. Marginal entropy can be treated
as a measure of the amount of variability contained within a given dataset. The
fact that marginal entropies for our measures were similar suggests that all
measures contained a comparable amount of variability.
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Fig. 3 The results of Experiment 1. a Difference scores in each source
contrast conditions. Significance stars indicate the results of one-sample t
tests against 0.While scores differed from 0 in the Seen vs. Told and Told
vs. Asserted conditions for both believability and accountability ratings,
scores in the Seen vs. Asserted conditions did not differ from 0 in the
believability task and differed only weakly in the accountability task. b
Left: Results of linear regression for the relationship between believabil-
ity and accountability difference scores depending on source contrast.
Scatter plots depict individual difference scores. Compared with baseline
(Asserted vs. Asserted), difference scores were more strongly correlated
in the Seen vs. Told and Told vs. Asserted, but not the Seen vs. Asserted
conditions. Right: Results of linear regression for the relationship be-
tween believability and likelihood difference scores depending on source
contrast. Compared with baseline, difference scores were less strongly
correlated in the Seen vs. Told and Told vs. Asserted, but not the Seen
vs Asserted conditions
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Prediction 1.1: What was the effect of source claims
on believability and accountability ratings?
In order to test whether ratings differed within source con-
trasts, we computed one-sample t tests (with a Bonferroni-
corrected alpha-level of .0083 (.05/6); see Fig. 3a) comparing
difference scores in each source contrast to 0 for both believ-
ability and accountability ratings. While believability as well
as accountability difference scores in both ‘seen vs. told’ trials
(MBelievability = 1.75, SD = 2.22, tBelievability = 15.2, pBelievability
< .0001;MAccountabiilty = 1.57, SD = 2.24, tAccountabiilty = 13.5,
pAccountabiilty < .0001) and ‘told vs. bare assertion’ trials
(MBelievability = −1.73, SD = 2.06, tBelievability = −16.1,
pBelievability < .0001; MAccountabiilty = −1.54, SD = 2.23,
tAccountabiilty = −13.3, pAccountabiilty < .0001) differed from 0,
in ‘seen vs. bare assertion’ trials only accountability difference
scores (MAccountabiilty = 0.23, SD = 1.64, tAccountabiilty = 2.74,
pAccountabiilty = .0064) and not believability difference scores
(MBelievability = 0.25, SD = 2.1, , tBelievability = 2.32, pBelievability
= .021) differed from 0.
Predictions 1.2 and 1.3: Was the relationship between
believability and accountability impacted by source
claims independently of likelihood?
To determine the extent to which believability and account-
ability judgments were associated with one another indepen-
dently of perceived likelihood (Prediction 1.2) and to assess
whether our source claim manipulation had an effect on this
relationship (Prediction 1.3), we computed a linear regression
model.5 We used accountability difference scores as the de-
pendent variable and entered likelihood difference scores as
well as the interaction between believability difference scores
and source contrast condition as predictors. We used a treat-
ment coding scheme for the source contrast factor specifying
the ‘bare assertion vs. bare assertion’ condition as the refer-
ence level (see Fig. 2b). This model, F(8, 1486) = 80.85,ΔR2
= 0.3, p < .0001, showed (in line with Prediction 1.2) that
believability ratings were associated with accountability rat-
ings in the baseline condition (β = 0.13, SE = 0.05, p = .012,
95% CI [0.03, 0.24]). As predicted, accountability judgments
were not affected by likelihood judgments (β = 0.03, SE =
0.02, p = .155, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.78]).
Further, partially confirming Prediction 1.3, the relation-
ship between accountability and believability differences
was modulated by our source claim manipulation such that
when a statement was associated with a ‘told’ claim, believ-
ability responses predicted accountability responses
(βBelief*Seen-Told = 0.17, SE = 0.07, p = .014, 95% CI [0.03,
0.3]; βBelief*Told-Asserted = 0.18, SE = 0.07, p = .011, 95% CI
[0.04, 0.31]) more strongly than in the ‘bare assertion vs. bare
assertion’ baseline contrast. However, contrary to what we
predicted, ‘seen’ claims did not have an effect on the associ-
ation between believability and accountability difference
scores (βBelief*Seen-Asserted = 0.02, SE = 0.07, p = .774, 95%
CI [−0.12, 0.15]) beyond that found in the baseline condition.
Prediction 1.4: Was the relationship between
believability and likelihood impacted by source
claims?
Next, we tested whether source contrast modulated the extent
to which believability difference scores were predicted by
likelihood difference scores (see Fig. 3b). As stated in
Prediction 1.4, if our source claim manipulation affected the
extent to which believability judgments depended on factors
other than mere perceived likelihood, we would expect there
to be an interaction effect between likelihood ratings and
source contrast: The presence of a source claim should reduce
the extent to which believability ratings were predicted by
likelihood ratings alone compared with the ‘bare assertion
vs. bare assertion’ reference level. To do so, we computed
another linear regression model, with believability difference
scores as the outcome variable, and predictors for accountabil-
ity difference scores as well as the interaction between source
contrast and likelihood difference scores. Again, the source
contrast factor was entered into the model via a treatment
coding scheme specifying the ‘bare assertion vs. bare asser-
tion’ condition as the reference group.
In line with the above prediction, the model, F(8, 1486) =
122.3, ΔR2 = 0.39, p < .0001, showed that even though like-
lihood differences predicted believability differences in the
baseline condition (βLikelihood = 0.41, SE = 0.04, p < .0001,
95% CI [0.32, 0.49]), when one of the statements was associ-
ated with a ‘told’ claim, likelihood difference scores were less
predictive of believability difference scores than in the base-
line condition (βLikelihood*Seen-Told = −0.15, SE = 0.06, p =
.022, 95% CI [−0.27, −0.02]; βLikelihood*Told-Asserted = −0.23,
SE = 0.06, p < .0001, 95% CI [−0.35, −0.12]). However, the
relationship between likelihood and believability difference
scores was not modulated in the ‘seen vs. asserted’ condition
compared with the ‘bare assertion vs. bare assertion’ baseline
(βLikelihood*Seen-Asserted = −0.05, SE = 0.06, p = .36, 95% CI
[−0.17, 0.06]).
Prediction 1.5: Did being asserted increase a
statements’ believability beyond its perceived
likelihood?
Finally, to assess whether merely being asserted increased a
statement’s believability compared with its prior likelihood,
we computed a paired-sample t test comparing likelihood and
5 Because each participant contributed only one difference score per source
contrast and vignette, mixed models did not converge for these analyses. For
this reason, we chose the generalized linear model approach instead.
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believability ratings for statements that were associated with a
bare assertion. This test suggested that believability ratings for
asserted statements (MBelief-Asserted = 3.73, SD = 1.07) were
higher than likelihood ratings for the same statements present-
ed without an associated speaker (MLikelihood-Asserted = 3.6, SD
= 1.01), t(426) = 6.99, p < .0001.
Discussion
Experiment 1 had two main goals. First, we wanted to deter-
mine whether claims to first-hand evidence increase, while
claims to second-hand evidence decrease both statement be-
lievability and speaker accountability. Second, we sought to
test whether the effect of evidential claims on statement be-
lievability can be explained through their effect on speaker
accountability.
Regarding the first goal (Prediction 1.1), evidence from
Experiment 1 was mixed. While claims to second-hand evi-
dence reliably reduced both statement believability and speak-
er accountability, the effect of claims to first-hand evidence
was less clear. In particular, bare assertions behaved similarly
to claims of first-hand evidence. While it is possible that
claims to first-hand evidence do not increase believability
and accountability compared with bare assertions, another
possibility is that participants interpreted bare assertions as
claims to first-hand evidence. In other words, because the
protagonists in our materials made claims about specific past
events that they could have (in fact, should have) experienced
themselves, participants might have assumed that they must
have based their assertion on first-hand evidence. Participants
might therefore have treated speakers who only implied to
have first-hand evidence in the same way as speakers who
explicitly claimed to have such evidence. This finding would
be in line with work showing that listeners often take speakers
to be committed to their implied meaning (Bonalumi et al.,
2020).
Regarding the second goal, Experiment 1 confirmed that
differences in accountability judgments predicted differences
in believability judgments independently of differences in
likelihood judgments (as stated in Prediction 1.2). Moreover,
we found evidence that merely asserting a statement increased
the statement’s believability compared with its prior likeli-
hood (as stated in Prediction 1.5)6. Both of these findings
are to be expected if making an assertion minimally commits
a speaker to the truth of her assertion and are not specifically
related to the effect of source claims.
Results regarding the effect of source claims on the rela-
tionship between believability, accountability, and likelihood
judgments were mixed. Recall that we predicted that being
associated with a source claim would increase the association
between believability and accountability (Predictions 1.3)
while decreasing the association between likelihood and be-
lievability (Predictions 1.4). However, our results suggest that
only ‘told’ claims followed this pattern: while difference
scores in source contrasts in which one of the statements
was associated with a ‘told’ claim showed a higher association
between believability and accountability judgments and a
lower association between believability and likelihood judg-
ments (compared with baseline), we did not find the same
effect for ‘seen’ claims.
What could explain this outcome? On the one hand, of
course, it is possible that ‘seen’ claims do indeed not influence
how strongly a statement’s believability is tied to how ac-
countable the speaker is taken to be for its truth. However,
on the other hand, if participants indeed interpreted bare as-
sertions as claims to first-hand evidence it is to be expected
that we would not find an increase in the association between
believability and accountability for ‘seen’ claims over bare
assertions. Thus, Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to test
whether participants in fact interpreted ‘seen’ statements and
bare assertions as claims to the same forms of evidence and
whether this could explain the lack of difference between
claims to first-hand evidence and bare assertions in
Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, claims to first-hand evidence and bare asser-
tions were hard to distinguish in terms of their impact on
statement believability and speaker accountability. Why did
claims to first-hand evidence not differ more strongly in their
effect on believability and accountability?
One possibility is that assertions about episodic claims
might have been implicitly interpreted as claims to first-hand
evidence by our participants. People might assume that when-
ever a speaker does not make an effort to explicitly specify her
source about an episode that plausibly occurred to her directly,
she must have first-hand evidence. On this view, first-hand
evidence might be seen as the ‘default’ source of evidence
for episodic claims such that only deviations from this default
warrant explicit mention. If this was the case, the fact that we
did not find stronger differences between ‘seen’ statements
and bare assertions in Experiments 1 could be explained by
the fact that, in fact, participants took both kinds of statements
as being associated with the same kind of source claim. Any
difference we observed would then have merely been due to
the explicitness of the source claim in the ‘seen’ condition.
6 This effect could be due to the fact that making an assertion provides evi-
dence to a listener that at least one person believes the claim in question or that
participants had already been exposed to each statement before making a
believability assessment about these assertions. Experiment 2 could rule out
the latter interpretation (i.e., that the increased believability of bare assertions
might have been a mere ‘repeated-exposure’ effect).
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This interpretation is also suggested by a recent study by
Degen et al. (2019; see also Altay, Majima, & Mercier,
2020, Experiment 3) who found that participants
interpreted bare assertions as being grounded in first-hand
evidence. To test for this possibility in the current context,
we developed a memory confusion paradigm with the ma-
terials from Experiment 1. After participants had made be-
lievability judgments as in Experiment 1, we presented
them with each statement again in a surprise memory test
for the source claim associated with each statement (‘seen’,
‘told’, ‘no source’). Since our hypotheses in this experi-
ment did not relate to the prior likelihood of statements,
we did not include a likelihood judgment task in
Experiment 2.
Our predictions were as follows:
Prediction 2.1: Source confusions should primarily affect
bare assertions; that is, participants should be unlikely to
confuse ‘seen’ and ‘told’ statements or ‘told’ statements
and bare assertions. As a result, participants should be
more accurate in their memory responses in the ‘seen’
than in the ‘bare assertion’ condition.
Prediction 2.2: If participants encode bare assertions as
‘seen’ statements, they should be more likely to confuse
bare assertions with ‘seen’ statements than vice versa.
Prediction 2.3: If these memory confusions are in-
deed an effect of how participants pragmatically in-
terpret statements in the believability task (rather than
merely an effect of how participants recall different
source claims) higher believability ratings should be
associated with statements that are recalled to have
been associated with a ‘seen’ claim compared with
those recalled as having been barely asserted. Such
an effect would also suggest that, controlling for
pragmatic interpretation, claims to first-hand evidence
increase a statement’s believability.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 196 native English-speaking participants from
the online testing platform Testable Minds (https://minds.
testable.org/; Rezlescu et al., 2020). As in the previous
experiment, we excluded all participants who provided the
same response to all questions in one of our two tasks
(believability judgments or memory judgments). Thirteen
participants were excluded this way so that 183 participants
were included in the final sample (mean age = 33.42 years,
SD = 8.56 years; 100 females).
Design
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 in materials, but
we removed both the likelihood and the accountability judg-
ment tasks. Instead, after having made believability judg-
ments, participants were asked to complete a distractor task
(solving 50 simple math problems of the form “11 + 23 = ?”)
before being presented with each vignette and the associated
statements (without source claims) in randomized order for a
surprise memory test. In this memory test, participants were
asked to recall for each statement what source claim it had
originally been associated with in a three-alternatives forced-




Distributions of believability and memory responses are
displayed in Fig. 4a and b, respectively. Experiment 2 largely
replicated the results of Experiment 1 in terms of believability
ratings.
Prediction 2.1: Were participants more accurate in
recalling ‘seen’ claims than ‘bare assertions’?
To analyze participants’ source claim recall, we fit a logistic
mixed-effects model to a binary variable coding for whether
participants had responded correctly in the memory task (yes/
no). This model included random effects for participant num-
ber and vignette number (with fixed slopes) and a fixed effect
for source claim condition (entered into the model via dummy
coding with ‘bare assertion’ serving as the reference level).
The p values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests (LRTs)
of the full model with the source claim effect against the mod-
el without this effect. For the estimates of the model parame-
ters, the 95% confidence intervals were assessed by comput-
ing a likelihood profile and finding the appropriate cutoffs
based on the LRT.
Model comparison suggested that, while participants per-
formed better at recalling ‘seen’ claims (MSeen-Recall = 0.68,
SDSeen-Recall = 0.35) than bare assertions (MAsserted-Recall =
0.56, SDAsserted-Recall = 0.36), χ
2(1) = 16.82, p < .0001, 95%
CI [0.31, 0.88], we did not find significant differences in recall
performance between ‘told’ claims and bare assertions (MTold-
Recall = 0.64, SDTold-Recall = 0.37), χ
2(1) = 3.05, p = .081.
Prediction 2.2: How likely were participants to
confuse bare assertions and ‘seen’ claims in recall?
Next, to determine whether participants produced source con-
fusions to suggest that they had encoded bare assertions as
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‘seen’ statements, we compared proportions of different mem-
ory error types to chance level (0.5) via one-sample t tests (see
Fig. 4b; with a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-level of .017 and
excluding those participants who did not make memory errors
in recalling a given type of source claim). This showed that
memory errors in the ‘told’ condition were roughly equally
distributed between ‘seen’ (M = 0.47, SD = 0.48) and ‘no
source’ responses, t(97) = 0.53, p = .599. In contrast, partici-
pants were more likely than chance to recall bare assertions as
‘seen’ (M = 0.86, SD = 0.27), t(133) = 15.7, p < .0001, and less
likely than chance to recall them as ‘told’. Further, participants
were also more likely to confuse ‘seen’ claims with bare as-
sertions (M = 0.7, SD = 0.45) than ‘told’ claims in memory,
t(91) = 4.33, p < .0001. To test whether participants were more
Fig. 4 The results of Experiment 2. a Believability difference scores in
each source contrast. b The distributions of remembered source claims as
a function of the source claim a given statement had originally been
associated with in the believability task. Participants were more likely
to confuse in recall bare assertions with ‘seen’ claims than vice versa. c
Correlations between believability ratings and ‘seen’ memory responses
(left) as well as believability ratings and ‘bare assertion/no source’ mem-
ory responses (right). Believability ratings predicted 'seen' memory re-
sponses but not 'bare assertion' memory responses.
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likely to confuse bare assertions with ‘seen’ claims than vice
versa (Prediction 2.2), we calculated the proportion of confu-
sions between bare assertions and seen claims (for each
participant that committed at least one of these confu-
sions) that was due to assertions being recalled as ‘seen’
(M = 0.73, SD = 0.36) and compared it to chance, t(150)
= 7.69, p < .0001 (see Fig 4b). This suggested that par-
ticipants were more likely to recall bare assertions as
‘seen’ claims than vice versa. Note also that the number
of participants who did not commit any memory errors
differed across source claim conditions: While only 49
(27%) participants recalled all bare assertions correctly,
85 (46%) participants recalled all told and 91 (50%) par-
ticipants recalled all seen statements correctly.
Prediction 2.3: Were believability ratings predicted by
‘seen’ or ‘bare assertion/no source’ memory
responses?
Next, we tested whether participants’ believability judgments
predicted whether they would remember a given statement to
have been associated with a claim to first-hand evidence com-
pared with another source claim (see Fig. 4c). To do so, we
first fit a binomial logistic mixed-effects model to a binary
variable coding for whether participants had responded with
‘seen’ in the memory test. We included believability judg-
ments and statements’ ‘original source claim’ (seen/told/bare
assertion) as fixed effects and participant number and vignette
number as random effects with fixed slopes. LRT-based mod-
el comparison showed that, controlling for the effects of a
statement’s original source, seen memory responses were pre-
dicted by participants believability ratings, χ2(1) = 9.94, p =
.002, 95% CI [0.06, 0.27]. We then fit the same model to a
binary variable coding for whether participants responded
with ‘no source’ in the memory test. However, LRT-based
model comparison suggested that believability ratings did
not predict ‘no source’ memory responses, χ2(1) = 0.07, p =
.934, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.10].
Prediction 1.5: Did bare assertions still increase
believability compared with prior likelihood when we
control for repeated exposure?
Recall that, in Experiment 1, we found that bare assertions
increased a statements believability compared with its per-
ceived prior likelihood. However, this effect might have been
caused by the fact that participants had been exposed to the
same statement repeatedly. In Experiment 2, in contrast to
Experiment 1, participants were exposed to each statement
for the first time in the believability judgment task. Thus, in
order to rule out that the believability increase associated with
bare assertions over a statement’s prior likelihood found in
Experiment 1 was merely due to repeated exposure, we
conducted an exploratory analysis comparing believability
ratings for bare assertions in Experiment 2 with likelihood
ratings for those same statements in Experiment 1 via a two-
sample t test. This test suggested that believability ratings for
bare assertions in Experiment 2 (MBelief-Asserted = 4.09,
SDBelief-Asserted = 1.34) were higher than likelihood ratings
for the same statements in Experiment 1 (MLikelihood-Asserted
= 3.67, SDLikelihood-Asserted = 1.44), t(316.33) = 5.70, p <
.0001.
Discussion
Experiment 2 confirmed Predictions 2.1 and 2.2: participants
were more likely to confuse bare assertions with ‘seen’ claims
in memory than vice versa without making similar confusions
between ‘seen’ and ‘told’ claims. These results support the
hypothesis that episodic assertions lacking an accompany-
ing evidential claim tend to be interpreted as being based on
first-hand evidence. This circumstance can explain why the
participants’ believability judgments for bare assertions and
claims to first-hand evidence looked similar in Experiments
1 and 2: they were sometimes interpreted to have the same
evidential basis. One might object to this interpretation by
pointing out that memory confusions could have occurred
at retrieval rather than at encoding: That is, participants
might have had a general bias to recall information as being
based on claims to first-hand evidence (for a similar effect
see Tosun, Vaid, & Geraci, 2013) without encoding bare
assertions as ‘seen’ claims. Note that such a retrieval-based
account would predict a general bias towards ‘seen’ claims
independently of a statement’s original source. However,
we only found a recall bias towards ‘seen’ claims for state-
ments that had originally been barely asserted and not for
‘told’ claims.
More importantly, however, Experiment 2 also con-
firmed Prediction 2.3: When participants encoded a given
statement as being associated with a claim to first-hand
evidence, that statement was associated with higher believ-
ability than when they did not. We did not find a similar
relationship between believability and ‘no source’ memory
responses. It is not obvious how a purely retrieval-based
interpretation of the memory confusion findings would ex-
plain this result. Instead, these results suggest that when the
participants indeed interpreted (and encoded) a given state-
ment as a claim to first-hand evidence, they also believed it
more than when they did not encode such an evidential
claim. Thus, when claims to first-hand evidence and bare
assertions are encoded as such (i.e., when the latter is not
confused with the former), they differ in their effect on
statement believability.
Finally, Experiment 2 also confirmed that bare asser-
tions increase the believability of a statement compared
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with its prior likelihood: bare assertions in Experiment 2
were associated with higher believability ratings com-
pared with likelihood ratings for the same statements in
Experiment 1.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 suggested that participants tended to interpret
bare assertions as claims to first-hand evidence and that
whether participants distinguished between these statement
types in memory was predicted by how much they had initial-
ly believed it. Thus, Experiment 2 provided an explanation for
why ‘seen’ statements and bare assertions behave similarly in
terms of statement believability. However, the fact that bare
assertions are implicitly interpreted as claims to first-hand
evidence might also provide an explanation for why these
claims behaved closely similar in terms of speaker account-
ability in Experiment 1. To test this hypothesis, Experiment 3
replicated the results of Experiment 2 and extended them to
accountability judgments. Thus, we sought to test whether
believability and accountability judgments would discrimi-
nate between whether participants responded with ‘seen’ or
‘no source’ in the memory test.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 200 native English-speaking participants from
Testable Minds. As in the previous two experiments, we
excluded 24 participants who provided the same response
to all questions in one of the three tasks (believability judg-
ments, memory judgments, or accountability judgments) as
well as three participants who did not answer the majority
of the math distractor questions correctly. Additionally, the
data files of 14 participants were corrupted due to technical
errors so that 159 participants were included in the final
sample (MAge = 35.90 years, SDAge = 13.47 years, 75
females).
Design
Experiment 3 was identical in design to Experiment 2, but
also included the accountability judgment task from
Experiment 1 after the memory test (see Fig. 1). That is,
after the participants had made believability judgments
about each statement, completed the math distractor task,
and recalled the source claim associated with each state-
ment, they were presented with each statement once again
together with new information revealing that each speaker
had been wrong. Crucially, unlike in Experiment 1, in the
accountability judgement task, statements were not present-
ed with their associated evidential claim (the complete pro-
cedure can be accessed here: https://www.testable.org/
experiment/2878/185472/start).
Experiment 3, therefore, allowed us to test the following
predictions:
Prediction 3.1: Both believability and accountability
judgments should discriminate between ‘seen’ and ‘bare
assertions’ memory responses.
Prediction 3.2:The association between believability and
accountability judgments should be modulated by which
source claim participants recalled a given statement to
have been associated with.
Results
Replication of Experiment 2
Regarding participants’ responses in the memory task, the
results of Experiment 3 were closely similar to those of
Experiment 2. LRT-based model comparison between logistic
mixed-effects models with random effects on the participant
and vignette level (with fixed slopes) revealed that participants
performed better at recalling ‘seen’ claims (MSeen-Recall = 0.67,
SDSeen-Recall = 0.36) than ‘bare assertions’ (MAsserted-Recall =
0.56, SDAsserted-Recall = 0.33), χ
2(1) = 12.12, p < .001, 95%
CI [0.23, 0.82], while there was no difference in recall be-
tween bare assertions and ‘told’ claims (MTold-Recall = 0.58,
SDTold-Recall = 0.39, p =.136).
Comparison of proportions of different memory error
types (see Fig. 4b) to chance level (0.5) via one-sample t
tests (with a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of 0.017)
showed that memory errors in the ‘told’ condition were
roughly equally distributed between ‘seen’ (M = 0.52, SD
= 0.47) and ‘no source’ (i.e., ‘bare assertion’) responses,
t(95) = 0.32, p = 0.75. In contrast, participants were sig-
nificantly more likely than chance to recall bare assertions
as ‘seen’ (and less likely than chance as ‘told’) claims:
similar to Experiment 2, an average proportion of 0.82
(SD = 0.3) of memory errors in bare assertion trials was
due to participants confusing bare assertions with ‘seen’
claims, t(122) = 12.01, p < .0001. Participants were also
more likely than chance to confuse ‘seen’ claims with
bare assertions in memory (and less likely than chance
to confuse them with ‘told’ claims; M = 0.71, SD =
0.44), t(81) = 4.2, p < .0001. However, a comparison to
chance of the proportion of confusions between bare as-
sertions and ‘seen’ claims that were due to bare assertions
being recalled as ‘seen’ (M = 0.73, SD = 0.36) suggested
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that this was by far the more common memory error,
t(135) = 7.46, p < .0001.
Prediction 3.1: Did both believability and
accountability judgments discriminate between ‘seen’
and ‘no source’ memory responses?
In order to assess whether believability and accountability
judgments would predict ‘seen’ memory responses, we
employed the same modeling approach as in Experiment 2.
That is, we fit a binomial logistic mixed-effects model to a
binary variable coding for whether participants had responded
with ‘seen’ in the memory test, and another to a binary vari-
able coding for whether they had responded with ‘no source’
in the memory test. Each model included statements’ original
source (seen/told/asserted, dummy coded), participants’ be-
lievability judgments, and participants’ accountability judg-
ments as fixed effects. As random effects, we included partic-
ipant and statement number with fixed slopes.7,8
LRT-based model comparison suggested that (controlling
for a statement’s original source) both believability, χ2(1) =
10.51, p = .001, 95%CI [0.06, 0.26], and accountability, χ2(1)
= 3.93, p = .047, 95% CI [0.001, 0.19], ratings predicted
participants’ ‘seen’ responses in the memory test. However,
neither believability judgments, χ2(1) = 0.84, p = .358, 95%
CI [−0.16, 0.06], nor accountability judgments, χ2(1) = 1.01, p
= .315, 95%CI [−0.05, 0.15], predicted ‘no source’ responses.
Prediction 3.2: Was the association between
believability and accountability judgments
modulated based on remembered source claims?
Finally, we computed separate linear regression models for
the relationship between believability and accountability rat-
ings based on what source claim participants remembered a
given statement to have been associated with. The results of
this analysis are summarized in Table 1 and suggest that
Experiment 3 confirmed Prediction 3.2: believability and ac-
countability ratings were associated whenever participants
recalled a statement as ‘seen’ or ‘told’ but not when they
recalled it to have been merely asserted. Thus, the association
between believability and accountability depended to some
extent on participants’ source claim recall.
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 and ex-
tended them to accountability judgments. While neither be-
lievability nor accountability ratings differed between origi-
nally presented ‘seen’ claims and bare assertions, both types
of ratings predicted ‘seen’ memory responses without
predicting ‘bare assertion’ memory responses. This suggests
that when participants in fact distinguish between bare asser-
tions and claims to first-hand evidence, they distinguish be-
tween them both in terms of how they impact statement be-
lievability and speaker accountability.
General discussion
The current study set out to investigate whether source claims
impact the believability of assertions purely through their
function as arguments (i.e., by appealing to people’s intuitions
about the reliability of different sources) or whether they also
affect what listeners’ take a speaker to be committed to. We
predicted that if source claims function as commitment de-
vices, they should impact how strongly believability and ac-
countability are associated with one another. More specifical-
ly, we asked two main research questions:
(1) To what extent do claims to first-hand evidence increase,
and claims to second-hand evidence decrease, statement
believability?
(2) To what extent are modulations in statement believabil-
ity by source claims associated with analogous modula-
tions in perceived speaker accountability?
In order to answer these questions, we compared the effects
of claims to first-hand (“I saw that . . .”) and second-hand
(“Somebody told me that . . .”) evidence to the effect of bare
assertions about specific past events in terms of statement
believability and speaker accountability.
Source claims increase the association between
believability and accountability
First, regarding Research Question 2, the main motiva-
tion for the present study was the investigation of the
mechanism by which source claims modulate statement
believability. We introduced a distinction between two
possible routes by which evidential claims might have
an impact on statement believability. On the one hand,
listeners might have intuitions about the differential re-
liability of different sources grounded in a tacit theory
about what happens to a piece of information as it is
transmitted between cognitive systems. Listeners might
assume that the more steps of inference a piece of
7 We used statement rather than vignette number here because participants
were presentedwith individual statements rather than the entire vignette setting
in the accountability judgment task.
8 Because a model with a two-tiered random effect structure did not converge
for ‘no source’ memory responses, we dropped the item (i.e., statement) level
random effect for this model.
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information has undergone, the more likely it is that it
has been corrupted. Thus, listeners might monitor the
number of ‘inferential steps’ a piece of information has
taken in order to arrive at them and adjust their belief in
that information accordingly. On the other hand, while it
seems plausible that listeners indeed might have such a
tacit theory, it is unlikely that it would explain the en-
tirety of the effect of evidential claims on statement be-
lievability. After all, talk is cheap and, as such, speakers
might purport to base their claims on a certain evidential
basis only to achieve a desired effect on believability.
Thus, the effect of a given source claim on believabil-
ity must come at a potential cost to the speaker in the
form of enhanced responsibility for the truth of their
assertion (see, e.g., Vullioud et al., 2016). The effect of
evidential claims on statement believability might there-
fore be driven by modulations in perceived speaker com-
mitment, which in turn should express itself in how ac-
countable a speaker is held for stating a falsehood. We
investigated this idea by testing the prediction that rat-
ings for statement believability and speaker accountabil-
ity would be more strongly associated in the presence of
an explicit evidential claim. Both Experiments 1 and 3
confirmed this prediction: Explicit evidential claims in-
creased the association between believability and account-
ability ratings. While this result is compatible with the idea
that source claims modulate statement believability partial-
ly through modulating speaker accountability, the correla-
tional nature of the current study does not allow us to draw
strong conclusions on this point. It is, for example, also
possible that modulations in statement believability drove
how accountable a speaker was perceived to be for its truth.
Future studies should therefore seek to establish a causal
relationship between speaker accountability and statement
believability not mediated by source claims. Nonetheless,
the results presented here tie in with the idea that tracking
where one’s own beliefs come from is not just important for
epistemic reasons (e.g., Mahr & Csibra, 2018; 2020; Mahr
et al., 2020). Instead, source information plays an important
role when one wants to transmit those beliefs to others by
allowing speakers to calibrate their conversational
commitments.
The effect of claims to first- and second-hand evi-
dence on statement believability
Regarding the question of the effect of source claims on state-
ment believability (Research Question 1, above), we found
that claims to second-hand evidence consistently decreased
both statement believability as well as speaker accountability
compared with claims to first-hand evidence and bare asser-
tions (Experiments 1–3). This result might be construed to
contradict findings by Collins and Hahn (2019) who found
that indirect evidentials (“I suspect that . . .”) did not protect
a speaker’s reputation from damage. However, Collins and
Hahn did not use explicit claims to second-hand evidence.
Indirect evidentials might thus be less effective at “hedging
one’s bets” and affect speaker commitment less than the less
committal reportative claims we used in the present study
(“Somebody told me . . .”).
The effect of claims to first-hand evidence both on believ-
ability and accountability was less clear-cut: In Experiment 1,
claims to first-hand evidence and bare assertions behaved
closely similar both in terms of their effects on statement be-
lievability and speaker accountability. On the one hand, such a
similarity might be expected given that claims to first-hand
evidence and bare assertions should commit the speaker to
the embedded proposition and therefore influence a state-
ment’s believability and speaker accountability in the same
direction. Indeed, we found evidence that merely being
asserted increased a statement’s believability compared with
how likely people would have thought it to be true otherwise
(Experiments 1 & 2).
On the other hand, however, Experiments 2 and 3
showed that participants tended to recall bare assertions as
claims to first-hand evidence. This suggests that they
interpreted bare assertions as not only committing the
speaker to the embedded proposition but also to having
good evidence about it. This finding thus adds to an
existing literature that memory encoding privileges implied
meanings over explicit utterances (Brewer, 1977; Chan &
McDermott, 2006). Moreover, it suggests that bare asser-
tions about episodic claims are routinely interpreted as
claims to first-hand evidence; a result in line with findings
by Degen et al. (2019). This effect, which we did not expect
Table 1 Predicting believability from accountability as a function of remembered and actual sources in Experiment 3
Believability ~ Accountability
Trial type ΔR2 β SE 95% CI t p
Remembered Seen* 0.011 0.11 0.04 [0.02 – 0.19] 2.57 .01
Remembered Told** 0.021 0.159 0.06 [0.04 – 0.28] 2.63 .009
Remembered “No Source” (Bare Assertion) -0.001 0.038 0.04 [-0.05 – 0.13] 0.85 .396
Note. The p values that survived Bonferroni-correction for multiple comparisons (.05/3 = .017) are printed in boldface.
Mem Cogn
to find when we launched this study, likely confounded our
comparison between claims to first-hand evidence and bare
assertions.
Nonetheless, this finding ties in with several observa-
tions in the literature on evidentials. On the one hand, it
has been found that listeners commonly infer from a
speaker’s use of a ‘more indirect’ evidential that she
was not in a position to provide a ‘more direct’ one
(Faller, 2001; Papafragou et al., 2007). Consequently,
speakers might not have to make explicit when they have
direct evidence but only when they do not have such
evidence. On the other hand, languages with evidential
systems generally tend to mark indirect compared with
direct information access: while the World Atlas of
Languages (de Haan, 2013) lists 166 languages that ex-
clusively mark indirect evidentials, and 71 languages
that mark both direct and indirect evidentials, it does
not list any languages only marking direct evidentials.
The f inding that bare asser t ions are commonly
interpreted as claims to direct perceptual evidence is also
in line with results from learnability experiments for ev-
identials (Saratsli et al., 2020). Saratsli et al. (2020)
found that reportative evidentials are easier to learn than
evidentials marking direct perceptual access. One expla-
nation these authors offered for this result was that per-
ception might be viewed as a ‘default’ mode of evidence
and therefore would be less informative to encode ex-
plicitly. The fact that participants in our experiments
tended to treat bare assertions as claims to first-hand
evidence supports this idea.
However, Experiments 2 and 3 accounted for this con-
found between bare assertions and ‘seen’ claims. The re-
sults from these experiments suggested that the extent to
which such a source claim is made explicit makes a differ-
ence in terms of how believable a statement and how ac-
countable for its truth its speaker is taken to be (Bonalumi
et al., 2020): Our participants’ believability and account-
ability judgments differentiated between statements they
remembered to have been asserted on the basis of first-
hand evidence from those remembered to have been
asserted on other grounds.
All in all, these results support the notion that whenever
participants took a speaker to make an assertion on the basis of
first-hand evidence, they took it to be more believable, while
claims to second-hand evidence had the opposite effect. Note,
though, that we tested these claims on a narrowly
circumscribed set of materials, and therefore it remains to be
determined to what extent these findings generalize to more
naturalistic contexts. Nonetheless, these results provide direct
experimental evidence for the intuitive notion that claiming
first-hand evidence causes people to treat a statement as more
believable while claiming second-hand evidence causes them
to treat it as less believable.
A ‘Kuzari effect’?
The medieval Jewish philosopher Judah Halevi famously
argued in the ‘Kuzari’ that the oral testimony of the story of
the Jewish Exodus from Egypt itself proves that it must
have occurred. In effect, according to Halevi, the fact that
the entirety of the Jewish people believed that the Exodus
from Egypt had occurred, should be reason for us to believe
so, too.
Reminiscent of this idea, in Experiments 1 and 2 we found
that participants believed a claim more after it had been
asserted compared with how likely they had judged it to be
beforehand. On the one hand, this effect might be due to the
fact that asserting a claim provides evidence to listeners that at
least one other person believes that claim. This might contrib-
ute to making it more believable. On the other hand, an asser-
tion might make a claim more believable because making an
assertion should commit the speaker to its truth, and listeners
might take the fact that a speaker takes responsibility for the
truth of a claim as a reason to believe it. While we could not
disentangle these two explanations in the current study, future
work should seek to do so.
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